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- Reviewer #1: This is a much improved version of the original paper. I liked it and 
recommend publication. I wonder, however, whether B&B could devote some further 
effort toward clarifying why allochiria and prior entry support their main contention, that 
is that neglect "...disrupts the spatio-temporal conditions of the existence of one side of 
space..". As of now, the link between those two syndromes and the hypothesis is extremely 
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Abstract. As shown by neuroscientific evidence, neglect may occur without elementary sensorimotor 
impairments.  The deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, which prevents 
the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. By analysing a series of 
neuropsychological results, in this paper we suggest a crucial role of time for the construction of a 
world: on this basis, we try to explain how it is possible that half the ontology gets lost. The analysis of 
the ontological implication of neglect will allow us to shed light on manifestations of the pathology 
apparently disconnected. 
 


























“…it might be the case that we find certain aspects of neglect puzzling, 
because we don’t find the whole business of neglect puzzling enough.” 
(Bisiach and Rusconi, 1990) 
 
Unilateral spatial neglect 
Unilateral neglect is a condition which has generated a great deal of interest in the past decade, as it 
reveals a vast amount of often bewildering behavioural manifestations. Patients suffering from 
unilateral spatial neglect fail to respond to stimuli, objects and even people located on their 
contralesional side – more frequently, the left hemispace. Depending on the severity of the 
pathology, neglect may be noticed merely by observing the patients’ spontaneous behaviour: 
patients with neglect may not notice objects on the left of a scene, may not eat food on the left side 
of the plate, may ignore the left part of words. If the examiner approaches them from the left side, 
they may address their responses to the opposite side, even if nobody is there (De Renzi et al., 
1982). They may bump into walls, doorways, and objects on the left side. Even in absence of 
dressing apraxia, they may forget to put on the left sleeve of their jacket or the left shoe. Other 
behavioural signs of left neglect include shaving or applying make-up only to the right side of the 
face. An endless list of examples could be given.  
Some of these behaviours may seem similar to those performed by subjects affected by 
homonymous hemianopia, a visual field disorder frequently observed after postchiasmatic brain 
damage. Similarly to neglect patients, patients with left hemianopia may show difficulties in 
detecting stimuli and finding objects in the left visual space. They may not avoid obstacles on the 
left side, bumping into people approaching them from that side, and may have difficulties with 
reading.  
Given these similarities, which may render the diagnosis of neglect problematic (Walker et 
al., 1991), one might conceive that patients show left neglect just because, as hemianoptic patients, 
they don’t see the left side of the visual world. This hypothesis is nevertheless falsified both at the 
anatomical level and at the functional level (see Kerkhoff, 2001). In hemianopia, no visual 
information can be detected in the contralateral visual field. The spatial representation of both 
hemispaces is nevertheless intact and hence it is sufficient that the patient turns his head to process 
information from the left side of space. In neglect, as we will see, the deficit is to be found at a 
higher, more abstract level of representation, preventing the patient not only from seeing, but from 
conceiving the contralesional space.  
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The hemiontology1 of neglect  
Unlike subjects affected by hemianopia, neglect patients not only don’t see stimuli presented in the 
contralateral half of space, but behave as if that half of space did not exist and never had existed. 
Indeed, the most astonishing aspect of neglect is perhaps this: patients suffering from it, not only are 
unable to perceive the left side of space, but are not even able to conceive it (Bisiach, 1993). 
If unlike the hemianoptic patient, the patient suffering from neglect doesn’t turn his head 
towards the left, this is because there is no left side of the world on which to shift his gaze.  
The neglect patient is unable to conceive the part of the world that the hemianoptic patient 
simply doesn’t see. The difference is not marginal (see Table 1 for two contrasting case examples).  
 
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
    ____________________ 
  
The world that the neglect patient perceives is also the world that he conceives: he misses 
nothing. In this sense, the perceived world is not half the world, but the whole world, all the world 
that the neglect patient is able to conceive.  
We don’t see the world behind us but nevertheless know a world exists behind us: the world 
stretches beyond the boundaries of the visual field. For a subject with neglect, the world doesn’t 
stretch beyond the boundaries of the right hemifield.  
 
____________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
____________________ 
 
In neglect the left side of the world doesn’t exist: or rather, there is no half side of the world, 
since there is no world stretching beyond the ipsilesional space2.  
Similar considerations can be proposed for object-centred neglect, where that being 
neglected is not the half side of space but the half side of each object (Driver and Halligan, 1991; 
Driver et al., 1994; Tipper and Behrmann, 1996). One might think that the left-hand side of the 
                                                 
1 In philosophy the term ontology is used with different meanings. In this paper the term  indicates “what there is”, i.e. 
the real  world, the whole of existing things. 
2 By positing that the neglect results in a disruption of the reality of the contralateral hemispace, we do not mean to deny 
that the stimuli presented in the contralateral hemispace may influence the processing of other data. Depending on the 
relevance of the stimuli, pre-attentive processing up to the level of meaning can take place in the neglect field without 
awareness (Berti and Rizzolatti, 1992). What we suggest is that those same stimuli don’t gain access to existence. 
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object is as if occluded: the subject with neglect doesn’t perceive it, but knows that it is there. This 
interpretation is nevertheless ruled out by empirical evidence: patients affected by neglect not only 
fail to respond to the left hand-side of the object, but behave as if the contralateral half of the object 
had never existed. 
 
Nothing to neglect 
Although not always explicitly stated, the common assumption is that this occurs because the 
patient with neglect is, in general, not aware of his deficit, but, as Halligan and Marshall (1998) 
note, this is often just not true: many patients with neglect have considerable conceptual and 
experiential insight into their deficit and its consequences3. The example reported by the authors is 
that of PP, a woman affected by visual neglect, showing a good insight into her neglect. In an 
interview recorded by the authors, PP provides a detailed account of how neglect affects the day-to-
day running of her life: she reports problems with dressing and grooming, difficulties in finding 
things in peripersonal space (“It takes a long time to find things if they are on the left hand side…”), 
and in navigating in extrapersonal space (“I kept turning to the right…”). PP begins then to expound 
her own phenomenology of neglect: 
 
 …I knew the word “neglect” was a sort of medical term for whatever was wrong but the word 
bothered me because you only neglect something that is actually there, don’t you? If it is not there, how can 
you neglect it? It doesn’t seem right to me that the word neglect should be used to describe it. I think they 
thought I was definitely, deliberately not looking to the left. I wasn’t really. It was painful looking to the 
left…People think you are not looking…you are neglecting to look but it’s not there. If it is not there you are 
not neglecting it.  
 
As it can be seen, PP has taken issue with the term “neglect”, but from her perspective, there 
is nothing to neglect: it is rather that the left space and the contents thereof are simply not there.  
 
A break-down of spatial awareness 
The world that the neglect patient perceives, we argued, is also the world that he conceives. Stating 
this we intend to mark the difference between neglect and non-cognitive disorders, like hemianopia.  
The case of PP forces us however to investigate more precisely the sense of this statement. 
That the neglect patient doesn’t conceive half the world is in fact true in a sense, but false in 
another. Patients like PP know perfectly well that people have two eyes, two arms and two legs, 
                                                 
3 For more details see Marcel et al. (2004). 
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nevertheless, when asked to sketch a person, reliably they draw only one eye, one arm or one leg to 
the right of the frontal configuration.  
A similar dissociation is evident in clock drawing tasks: patients who clearly know how 
many numbers there are on a standard clock will nonetheless only reproduce numbers from 12 to 6, 
insisting that their drawing is finished and complete.  
 Rode et al. (2004) asked a patient with unilateral neglect to evoke mentally the map of 
France in two different conditions. In the first condition, he was asked to imagine the map of France 
and to list all the towns that he could ‘see’. In the second condition, he had to remember and name 
as many French towns as possible, without being instructed to form a mental image. Left neglect 
was observed in the first condition, but not in the second. When explicitly asked to imagine the map 
of France, the patient systematically omitted towns located on the western part of the map. However 
that part of geographical knowledge could be recalled from a linguistic description, clearly 
indicating that the representational neglect shown by the patient did not result from a memory 
disturbance but was rather due to a disturbance in the analogical representation4.  
The patient knows that in France there is town called Bordeaux, but Bordeaux disappears 
from his conception when the task requires him to form a spatial representation.  
 
These and other observations enlighten the spatial character of neglect: as Berti (2000) 
notes, what is impaired in neglect is not the representation and the awareness of the stimuli per se, 
but the representation of the left space.  
In this paper we don’t intend to challenge the view that neglect is a spatial disorder. What 
we do want to insist upon, however, is that the unilateral loss observed in neglect cannot be 
attributed to a disorder of spatial representation only. It must necessarily involve another dimension. 
This dimension, we suggest, is time. 
  
Beyond space  
The notion that neglect patients suffer from a ‘representational map reduced to one half’ was 
explicitly and definitively presented to the scientific community by Bisiach and Luzzati (1978). The 
authors asked two patients with right brain lesions to imagine themselves at one end of a well-
known square (Piazza del Duomo in Milan) and describe all the business places around the square. 
                                                 
4 It has been proposed that representational neglect could be due to a defective spatial working memory (Beschin et al., 
1997). Although a role for mnemonic impairment cannot be ruled out in some cases, it is nevertheless difficult to see 
how it could account for Rode et al.’s findings, especially as the patient of Rode et al. tend to follow a proximity 
criterion in naming towns.  
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As one would expect in the hypothesis of a defect of space representation, both patients failed to 
recall shops, cafes, etc., on the left.  
The next step in the experiment was for subjects to imagine themselves looking at the 
cathedral from the opposite end of the square.  Remarkably, in this latter condition, patients named 
the previously neglected places but omitted those recalled just a few moments before.  
Even more astonishing is the fact that subjects did not show any dismay. It should be noted 
that the subjects in question did not present any mnemonic impairment and that they probably 
would have been surprised - at least as anyone of us would have been – if they had seen an object 
disappearing instantaneously on their right (the countercheck had not been done). How is it 
possible, when they take the second perspective, for them not to be aware of the contents of their 
own output when they reported the view from the opposite end of the piazza? 
What is striking with respect to other examples of dissociated performance is that here the 
dissociation originates from a mere shift in perspective. In the Rode et al. (2004) study, the 
dissociation could be interpreted as dissociation between propositional representation (intact) and 
analogical representation (impaired). In the experiment of Piazza del Duomo the dissociation affects 
two images of the same square. 
 
Ontological implications 
Imagining themselves standing with their back turned to the cathedral, patients recalled half the 
square. Imagining themselves standing at the opposite end, patients recalled the other half of the 
imagined scene. Even though they remembered both halves, they were nevertheless unable to recall 
the whole square at any one time. Why? Why didn’t they stick the two halves together?   
Berti and Rizzolatti (1992) propose that the encoding of space is a necessary prerequisite for 
conscious perception. If spatial encoding is prevented or impaired, as it is in neglect, the presence of 
the stimulus does not enter consciousness. With respect to Bisiach and Luzzatti’s (1978) 
experiment, a lack of spatial awareness per se doesn’t however seem to constitute a sufficient 
explanation: a spatially constrained disorder of awareness (Berti, 2000) might explain why, at any 
one moment, the patient is unable to represent the whole scene, not why the two halves don’t form a 
whole. 
The lack of awareness must concern not only the left side of space, but its absence. The 
contralesional space is not merely neglected: its absence is indeed lacking.  
The mere absence implies that something is missed: something that has been, is no longer 
present. In neglect the left side of space is not merely not present: it is this ‘not present’ that is 
lacking. This absence of what is lacking reveals a fracture which is not only spatial, but temporal. 
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Whilst the mere absence simply implies that the object is not present, the absence of what is lacking 
requires in fact not only that the object doesn’t exist in the present, but that it had never existed and  
never would exist. 
 
Time and ontology: abnormal temporal dynamics in neglect5 
Time is an indispensable attribute for external realities (see Becchio and Bertone, 2003): objects 
exist before their apparition (permanence of anteriority) and continue to exist even when they 
ceased to be visible (permanence of posteriority).   
Despite our impression of a full and coherent world as immediate and instantaneous, 
‘seeing’ is itself a temporal fact, requiring an integration over time (Humphreys, 1997). Since visual 
information is sampled at high resolution over only a few degrees of visual angle at the fovea, a 
complete representation of a scene requires the contents of individual eye fixations to be integrated 
over space and time (Resink, 2000). In the primary visual cortex, the retinal image is constructed 
anew at each eye fixation, overwriting all information previously encoded. Without re-mapping to 
maintain and re-locate neural activity corresponding to these inputs, this general overwriting 
phenomenon would lead to the disappearance of relevant information across ocular shifts: the world 
would appear as a sequence of non–integrated visual snapshots, at different spatial scale (Pisella & 
Mattingley, 2004). 
Re-mapping deficits in neglect are suggested by studies requiring patients to make two 
successive saccades in order to fixate two sequentially flashed targets (double-step paradigm). If the 
two targets (A and B) are extinguished during the execution of the first saccade, then the generation 
of a spatially accurate second saccade requires re-mapping for updating the spatial representation of 
the extinguished target B. In a study by Duhamel et al. (1992), the patient, showing neglect in 
consequence of a frontoparietal damage, performed well with targets flashed first into the right field 
and then into the left field. When she was asked to do the same task with a target flashed first in the 
left field and then in the right field, she completed the first saccade correctly, but never acquired the 
second target, even though this required her to make a saccade in the ipsilesional direction.  
Examining patients with unilateral lesions of various structures, Heide et al. (1995) found 
that both right and left lesions of the parietal posterior cortex (PPC) caused errors in double-step 
saccades. Each pair of targets was located either in the same hemifield (within–hemifield condition) 
or in different hemifields (between-hemifields condition). Both patients with right and left PPC 
lesions showed an elevated percentage of errors when in double–step saccades that involved 
                                                 
5 A review of the temporal deficits in neglect is beyond the scopes of this work. Our analysis will be thus limited to 
those temporal aspects that – this is our suggestion – contribute to the unilateral of reality. 
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crossing the midline (between-hemifields condition). In addition, patients with right PCC – all of 
whom showed initially neglect – showed significant errors under conditions in which double-step 
saccades had to be performed entirely within the left visual field.   
From these results, a remapping deficit would be demonstrated in neglect patients within the 
left visual hemifield. As a consequence, updating and maintenance of spatial representation over 
time (persistence) may result impaired. An additional deficit may arise in the stage of selection.  
Individuals without any neurological abnormality experience a significant loss of attention 
after engaging a target for purpose of identification (Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro et al., 1994; 
Duncan et al., 1994). This loss of temporal attention, known as ‘attentional blink’ lasts about 400ms 
and is usually attributed to an inability to retain usable representation of a second target while 
completing attentive processing of a first target.  
Using standard procedure, which consists in presenting a rapid serial visual sequence 
(RSVP) of letters presented successively at the same location, Husain et al. (1997) showed that 
neglect patients have an abnormally severe and protracted attentional blink, lasting nearly three 
times as long as for healthy observers. 
Husain et al. (1997) examined the attentional blink at one central location. In a recent single-
case study Hillstrom et al. (2004) varied the location of the second target: whereas the first target 
was always presented at fixation, the second target appeared either at fixation or peripherally to the 
left or the right. This variation led to an interesting finding: the patient with left-side neglect showed 
a prolonged attentional blink in identifying the second stimulus when the second stimulus appeared 
contralesionally, an attentional blink of normal duration when the stimulus appeared at fixation and 
no significant attentional blink when the second stimulus appeared ipsilesionally. This result 
suggests that the temporal dynamics of attentional processing may be enhanced compared to normal 
performance for ipsilesional stimuli, whereas it is significantly prolonged for stimuli appearing to 
the left. When two objects are simultaneously presented, this abnormal temporal dynamic may lead 
to neglecting contralesional objects (Humphreys, 1997): if selection of ipsilesional stimuli is 
speeded up and there is also a spatial bias towards ipsilesional locations, then contralesional stimuli 
may be missed. The temporal distortion results thus in an ontological landslide, sweeping away the 
left side of the world. 
 
Two halves: not a whole 
We started from the experiment by Bisiach e Luzzati (1978) to introduce the hypothesis that the 
disorder that underlies neglect is not confined to space but also involves time. The neglect patient 
remembers both halves of the square, but is still unable to remember the whole square at anyone 
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time. If this occurs, we reasoned, this must be because the two halves of the square don’t co-exist at 
the same time.  
____________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
  __________________ 
 
Experimental evidence presented in the previous section supports this conclusion. In normal 
conditions, re-mapping mechanisms allow the integration of successive perception in a world of 
temporally enduring entities. Items successively selected co-exist within a continuous space-time.  
Disrupting the temporal continuity between one side of the space and the other, neglect not 
only prevents the representation of half the space, but renders impossible a spatial continuity 
between successively represented hemi-spaces. Changing point of view, as requested in the 
experiment of Piazza del Duomo, has thus a twofold ontological effect: one side of the space ceases 
to exist, the other side explodes into existence.  The result is a sequence of hemi-structures 
independent in both time and ontology.   
 
Conclusive considerations 
Previous research on neglect has above all been concerned with what patients with neglect can do 
despite their apparent lack of awareness. The lack of awareness per se, its nature, the paradoxes it 
raises, have attracted comparatively little interest (Halligan and Marshall, 1998). 
The idea proposed in this paper is that neglect leads to an absence, which is not a simple 
absence but a lack of absence. This lack of absence originates from a disruption of the conditions of 
existence which involves both space and time.  
One of the advantages of describing neglect both in its spatial and temporal features is that it 
allows one to see the relation between deficits that at different levels of analysis may appear as 
merely concomitant symptoms. The example that we analyse in this concluding section is that of 
allochiria and prior entry.  
 
Allochiria 
The term allochiria indicates the spatial transposition, usually symmetrically, of a stimulus from one 
side of the space to the opposite side. Neglect patients may show allochiria in several tasks, such as 
completion of geographical maps (Battersby et al., 1954; Benton et al., 1974), verbal description 
(Bisiach et al. 1981; Guariglia et al. 1993), manual pointing of visual targets (Joanette and 
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Brouchon, 1984), drawing from memory (Halligan et al., 1992a; Riddoch and Humphryes, 1983), 
copying drawings (Halligan et al. 1992b).   
Halligan et al. (1992b) described a patient who, in copying a butterfly, omitted the left wing. 
However, he drew some of the left-side details on the right wing (see Figure 3). 
 
____________________ 




As Berti (2002) notes, the phenomenon is obviously related to the capacity of processing 
left-side-neglected stimuli. What is striking is the dissociation between the “what” and the “where” 
in the patient’s experience: the “what”, which is preserved, is mislocated, being transposed in the 
opposed side of space. 
  
Prior entry 
A similar transposition, though in the temporal dimension, exists, we suggest, with the phenomenon 
of prior entry.  
  The phenomenon, found both in the visual modality (Rorden et al., 1997) and the auditory 
modality (Karnath et al., 2002), consists in the fact that an ipsilesional event is perceived as 
occurring earlier than physically synchronous contralesional stimulus. In Rorden et al. (1997) study, 
two patients with left-sided visual extinction after right parietal damage were each presented with 
two unconnected bars, one in each visual field. The patients’ task was to judge which appeared 
sooner. Both patients reported that the right bar preceded the left unless the latter led by over 200 
msec, suggesting a severe bias to the right, affecting the time-course of visual awareness.  
The phenomenon, we propose, may be described as a transposition in time: separate events, 
physically synchronous, are relocated in time so that the left-side event appears as happening later.  
As in the case of allochiria, the transposition entails a dissociation: in prior entry, this 
dissociation takes place between the “what” and the “when”.  
 
____________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
    ____________________ 
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The interpretation here proposed of neglect suggests that both in allochiria and in prior entry 
the mislocation of the stimuli doesn’t result from a defective mapping of the spatial/temporal 
relations between the different elements sampled. Indeed, the stimuli are not mislocated at all, but  
re-located in order to avoid the ontological landslide that neglect brings about.  
In allochiria the contralesional stimulus escapes from neglect by moving into another space, 
in the phenomenon of prior entry the transposition occurs in another time. In both cases the 
contralesional stimulus gains an access to existence, but this access is transposed into the hemifield 
in which the spatio-temporal conditions of existence are preserved. 
 
____________________ 
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Figure 1. Highly schematic representation of the relationship between world (ontology) and perception in 
normal, hemianoptic and neglect subjects. In normal conditions the world stretches beyond the perceptive 
field. In hemianopia the world ontology is intact: the subject doesn’t perceive the left hemifield, but he 
knows that there must be a left hemifield. In unilateral neglect, not only the perception but the ontology is cut 
in half: the contralateral hemifield doesn’t exist. The (half)world perceived is all that exists. 
 
Figure 2. In normal conditions, the features of the square, independently from the order in which they have 
been mentioned, form a unitary spatio-temporal structure, in which they simultaneously exist.  In neglect, the 
features that from time to time fall within the ipsilesional space are bound together in an independent 
structure. The relation of simultaneousness is preserved within each aggregate, but not between the features 
of different aggregates.  (t: time). 
 
Figure 3. Stimulus for copying (full butterfly) and patient’s copy. From Halligan, Marshall and Wade 
(1992). 
 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the destiny of the contralesional stimulus in neglect, allochiria and 
prior entry (t. time). 
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Table 1. Case examples of a patient with left-side, homonymous hemianopia (HH) and a patient with left-
side neglect (N). E: examiner. Both patients had objective difficulties in reading as well as in visual 




Left hemianoptic patient without neglect (HH) 
 
E: Did you experience any significant changes in vision 
since your illness (brain infarction)? 
HH: Yes, I have problems perceiving things on my left; 
and reading is a problem. 
E: Why is reading a problem? 
HH: It is slower than before my illness and more 
exhausting. Sometimes I omit words on my very 
left...or I omit a whole line. I only realize it at the end 
of a sentence when it doesn’t make sense... 
E: Do you have any other visual impairment? 
HH: Yes, sometimes I bump into things or persons on 
my left, or detect them rather late... 
E: What about your orientation outside the clinic, can 
you find your way? 
HH: It’s difficult, especially when many people are 
around, on places...or when I have to find one particular 
thing, i.e. in a supermarket...when it is on the left... 
 
Left hemineglect patient without hemianopia (N) 
 
E: Did you experience any significant changes in vision 
since tour illness (brain infarction)? 
N: No, I haven’t realized any changes. Except...the 
spectacles don’t fit. 
E: Do you have problems with reading? 
N: No, not really. 
E: Do you omit words or syllables on your left side? 
N: no, I don’t think so. 
E: Have you noticed that your vision is impaired on 
your left side? 
N: The left eye is fine, no problem. 
E: Do you sometimes bump into things or persons on 
your left side? 
N: Rarely. Well, sometimes it occurs, but that is 
because there are so many people in this hospital, and 
they don’t care... 
E: Can you find your way inside the clinic, and 
outside? 








Table 2. Features of allochiria and prior entry. 
 
ALLOCHIRIA  PRIOR ENTRY 
Transposition in space  Transposition in time 
Dissociation between what and where Dissociation between what and when 
 
Tables
